fix: composite nested uses clone token (#1041)

## Summary

A nested `uses:` action inside a **local composite action** fails to clone with a bare `authentication required: Unauthorized` (401) when the instance resolves host-less action references against itself (`DEFAULT_ACTIONS_URL = self`). The job fails at the composite **main→post boundary**, even though the composite's own steps and all post-steps report success.

## Root cause

`newCompositeRunContext` nils `Config.Secrets` so composite steps do not see job secrets. But the action-clone path in `prepareActionExecutor` sourced its token via `getGitCloneToken` → `Config.GetToken()` → `Config.Secrets`, which is empty inside a composite RunContext. The nested action is therefore cloned anonymously → 401 against the authenticated instance.

Two details explain the exact symptom:

- It surfaces at the composite **main→post boundary** because the swallowed nested-step error is re-emitted by `common.JobError` at the end of the composite main pipeline.
- It carries **no clone URL** because, on a warm action cache, only `r.Fetch` runs (not `PlainClone`), and the go-git fetch error is returned verbatim.

## Fix

Source the clone token from `github.Token` instead of `Config.Secrets`. It is preserved across the composite config copy (`Config.Token` / `PresetGitHubContext`) and is identical to `Config.GetToken()` at the top level, so top-level and `act exec` behaviour is unchanged. The `shouldCloneURLUseToken` host gate is kept so the token is never sent to a foreign host. This also aligns the git-clone path with the ActionCache fetch path, which already uses `github.Token`.

Reusable workflows are unaffected — their RunContext keeps `Config.Secrets`.

## Before / after

Local composite action with a nested `uses:` (+ post step), followed by a marker step. Same workflow, same runner host — only the runner fix differs.

| Job step | Before fix | After fix |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `Run actions/checkout@v6` | ✅ success | ✅ success |
| `Run ./.gitea/actions/probe-composite` (nested `uses:` + post) | ❌ **failure** — bare 401 at the main→post boundary | ✅ success |
| `Step after composite` | ⊘ **skipped** | ✅ **ran** |
| Job result | ❌ **failed** | ✅ **succeeded** |

### Before — boundary log

```text
::endgroup::
##[error]authentication required: Unauthorized   ← bare 401, no clone target
Run Post ./.gitea/actions/probe-composite
Success - Post ./.gitea/actions/probe-composite  ← post steps run and succeed
Success - Post actions/checkout@v6
Job failed
```

The composite's own steps and both post-steps report `Success`; the job fails solely on the bare 401 emitted at the main→post boundary, and the next step is skipped.

### After — boundary log

```text
Run ./.gitea/actions/probe-composite
  ...composite steps...
Success - ./.gitea/actions/probe-composite
Run Marker after composite
PASSED composite boundary — no 401 (runner fix confirmed)
Success - Marker after composite
Job succeeded
```

## Reproduction

`.gitea/actions/probe-composite/action.yml`:

```yaml
name: probe-composite
runs:
  using: composite
  steps:
    - uses: actions/setup-node@v6   # nested uses → has a post step
      with: { node-version: 22 }
    - run: echo "composite inner step OK"
      shell: bash
```

`.gitea/workflows/probe.yaml`:

```yaml
on: [push]
jobs:
  composite-boundary:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
      - uses: ./.gitea/actions/probe-composite
      - run: echo "step after composite"   # skipped before the fix; runs after
```

## Verification

- **Before:** bare 401 at the boundary, reproduced with a `delay=0` tail — rules out a token-TTL / expiry effect; it is a missing credential.
- **After:** the composite step succeeds, the step after the composite runs, the job succeeds, and there is no `authentication required` in the log.
- A reusable workflow (`workflow_call`) with the same nested `uses:` + post step never hit the 401, which isolated the bug to the composite main/post path.

## Tests

Adds `TestStepActionRemoteCloneTokenSurvivesNilSecrets` (`act/runner`): asserts the clone token is forwarded when the RunContext mirrors a composite (`Secrets == nil`, token via `Config.Token`), and that the host gate still withholds the token for a foreign host. Verified to fail without the fix and pass with it.

---------

Reviewed-on: https://gitea.com/gitea/runner/pulls/1041
Reviewed-by: Zettat123 <39446+zettat123@noreply.gitea.com>
Co-authored-by: Christian Heim <christian@heimdaheim.de>
Co-committed-by: Christian Heim <christian@heimdaheim.de>

act/runner/action.go

@@ -6,7 +6,9 @@ package runner
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"crypto/sha256"
 	"embed"
+	"encoding/hex"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
@@ -272,6 +274,36 @@ func removeGitIgnore(ctx context.Context, directory string) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
+// dockerActionImageTag derives the local docker image tag used when an action
+// is built from a Dockerfile.
+//
+// For Gitea: a local action (`uses: ./` or `uses: ./path`) has an actionName
+// that is the workspace-relative path of the action. That path is identical
+// across repositories (e.g. "./" for a self-referencing action), so without
+// namespacing, every repository's local docker action would build and reuse the
+// same `act-dockeraction:latest` image on a shared docker daemon. A subsequent
+// repository would then silently run the image built for an earlier one.
+// Including the repository keeps the tag stable for caching within a repository
+// while preventing cross-repository collisions.
+// See https://gitea.com/gitea/runner/issues/1039.
+func dockerActionImageTag(repository, actionName string, localAction bool) string {
+	name := actionName
+	if localAction {
+		name = path.Join(repository, actionName)
+	}
+	// The human-readable name is sanitized by collapsing every non-alphanumeric character to "-".
+	sanitized := regexp.MustCompile("[^a-zA-Z0-9]").ReplaceAllString(name, "-")
+	if localAction {
+		// For local actions a short hash of the raw repository and action path is appended so the tag stays unique per repository.
+		sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(repository + "\x00" + actionName))
+		sanitized += "-" + hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])[:12]
+	}
+	// "-dockeraction" ensures that "./", "./test " won't get converted to "act-:latest", "act-test-:latest" which are invalid docker image names
+	image := fmt.Sprintf("%s-dockeraction:%s", sanitized, "latest")
+	image = "act-" + strings.TrimLeft(image, "-")
+	return strings.ToLower(image)
+}
+
 // TODO: break out parts of function to reduce complexicity
 func execAsDocker(ctx context.Context, step actionStep, actionName, actionDir, basedir string, localAction bool) error {
 	logger := common.Logger(ctx)
@@ -286,10 +318,7 @@ func execAsDocker(ctx context.Context, step actionStep, actionName, actionDir, b
 		// Apply forcePull only for prebuild docker images
 		forcePull = rc.Config.ForcePull
 	} else {
-		// "-dockeraction" enshures that "./", "./test " won't get converted to "act-:latest", "act-test-:latest" which are invalid docker image names
-		image = fmt.Sprintf("%s-dockeraction:%s", regexp.MustCompile("[^a-zA-Z0-9]").ReplaceAllString(actionName, "-"), "latest")
-		image = "act-" + strings.TrimLeft(image, "-")
-		image = strings.ToLower(image)
+		image = dockerActionImageTag(step.getGithubContext(ctx).Repository, actionName, localAction)
 		contextDir, fileName := filepath.Split(filepath.Join(basedir, action.Runs.Image))
 
 		anyArchExists, err := ContainerImageExistsLocally(ctx, image, "any")

act/runner/action_test.go

@@ -455,3 +455,50 @@ func TestExecAsDockerHoldsCloneLockForRemoteUncached(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatal("execAsDocker did not return after inner was released and ctx was canceled")
 	}
 }
+
+func TestDockerActionImageTag(t *testing.T) {
+	// Remote actions already carry a unique, ref-scoped actionName (the uses
+	// hash), so the tag must be left untouched for backwards compatibility.
+	assert.Equal(t,
+		"act-abc123-dockeraction:latest",
+		dockerActionImageTag("owner/repo", "abc123", false),
+	)
+
+	// Local actions keep a human-readable, repository-namespaced prefix and gain a short hash suffix that makes the tag unique per (repository, actionName).
+	// See https://gitea.com/gitea/runner/issues/1039.
+	assert.Equal(t,
+		"act-owner-repo-baca2daaa2fe-dockeraction:latest",
+		dockerActionImageTag("owner/repo", "./", true),
+	)
+	assert.Equal(t,
+		"act-owner-repo-sub-e847b61255a8-dockeraction:latest",
+		dockerActionImageTag("owner/repo", "./sub", true),
+	)
+
+	// Sanitizing every non-alphanumeric character to "-" is lossy, so distinct inputs can collapse to the same readable prefix.
+	// The hash suffix must keep such cases apart, otherwise an image built for one repository is reused for another.
+	collisions := [][2]struct {
+		repoName   string
+		actionName string
+	}{
+		// Two different repositories, both `uses: ./`: "a/b-c" and "a-b/c" both sanitize to "a-b-c".
+		{{"a/b-c", "./"}, {"a-b/c", "./"}},
+		// A repository's root action vs another repository's sub-path action:
+		// "owner/repo-a" + "./" and "owner/repo" + "./a" both sanitize to "owner-repo-a".
+		{{"owner/repo-a", "./"}, {"owner/repo", "./a"}},
+	}
+	for _, c := range collisions {
+		assert.NotEqual(t,
+			dockerActionImageTag(c[0].repoName, c[0].actionName, true),
+			dockerActionImageTag(c[1].repoName, c[1].actionName, true),
+			"local docker action tags must differ for %q/%q vs %q/%q",
+			c[0].repoName, c[0].actionName, c[1].repoName, c[1].actionName,
+		)
+	}
+
+	// Distinct local actions within the same repository keep distinct tags.
+	assert.NotEqual(t,
+		dockerActionImageTag("owner/repo", "./", true),
+		dockerActionImageTag("owner/repo", "./sub", true),
+	)
+}

act/runner/step_action_remote.go

@@ -114,9 +114,18 @@ func (sar *stepActionRemote) prepareActionExecutor() common.Executor {
 
 		actionDir := fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s", sar.RunContext.ActionCacheDir(), sar.Step.UsesHash())
 		defaultActionURL := sar.RunContext.Config.DefaultActionURL()
-		token := getGitCloneToken(sar.getRunContext().Config, sar.remoteAction.CloneURL(defaultActionURL))
+		// For Gitea
+		// A composite RunContext nils Config.Secrets, so getGitCloneToken would yield an
+		// empty token and clone the action anonymously (401 against the authenticated
+		// instance). github.Token survives the composite config copy and matches the
+		// top-level token; keep the shouldCloneURLUseToken host gate to avoid leaking it.
+		cloneURL := sar.remoteAction.CloneURL(defaultActionURL)
+		token := ""
+		if shouldCloneURLUseToken(sar.RunContext.Config.GitHubInstance, cloneURL) {
+			token = github.Token
+		}
 		gitClone := stepActionRemoteNewCloneExecutor(git.NewGitCloneExecutorInput{
-			URL:         sar.remoteAction.CloneURL(defaultActionURL),
+			URL:         cloneURL,
 			Ref:         sar.remoteAction.Ref,
 			Dir:         actionDir,
 			Token:       token,

act/runner/step_action_remote_test.go

@@ -838,3 +838,83 @@ func Test_safeFilename(t *testing.T) {
 		})
 	}
 }
+
+// Regression: a nested action in a composite cloned anonymously (401) because the
+// composite RunContext nils Config.Secrets. The token must come from github.Token,
+// which survives the config copy; the host gate must still withhold it cross-host.
+func TestStepActionRemoteCloneTokenSurvivesNilSecrets(t *testing.T) {
+	const wantToken = "job-token"
+
+	table := []struct {
+		name                  string
+		gitHubInstance        string
+		defaultActionInstance string
+		wantCloneToken        string
+	}{
+		{
+			name:           "same host forwards token despite nil secrets",
+			gitHubInstance: "gitea.example.com",
+			wantCloneToken: wantToken,
+		},
+		{
+			name:                  "foreign host is not given the token",
+			gitHubInstance:        "gitea.example.com",
+			defaultActionInstance: "github.com",
+			wantCloneToken:        "",
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range table {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			ctx := context.Background()
+
+			var capturedToken string
+			origStepAtionRemoteNewCloneExecutor := stepActionRemoteNewCloneExecutor
+			stepActionRemoteNewCloneExecutor = func(input git.NewGitCloneExecutorInput) common.Executor {
+				capturedToken = input.Token
+				return func(ctx context.Context) error { return nil }
+			}
+			defer (func() {
+				stepActionRemoteNewCloneExecutor = origStepAtionRemoteNewCloneExecutor
+			})()
+
+			sarm := &stepActionRemoteMocks{}
+			sar := &stepActionRemote{
+				Step: &model.Step{Uses: "org/repo@v1"},
+				RunContext: &RunContext{
+					Config: &Config{
+						GitHubInstance:        tt.gitHubInstance,
+						DefaultActionInstance: tt.defaultActionInstance,
+						ActionCacheDir:        "/tmp/test-cache",
+						// Mirrors the state of a composite RunContext: job secrets are
+						// stripped, but the job token is still reachable via Config.Token.
+						Secrets: nil,
+						Token:   wantToken,
+					},
+					Run: &model.Run{
+						JobID: "1",
+						Workflow: &model.Workflow{
+							Jobs: map[string]*model.Job{"1": {}},
+						},
+					},
+					StepResults: map[string]*model.StepResult{},
+				},
+				readAction: sarm.readAction,
+			}
+			sar.RunContext.ExprEval = sar.RunContext.NewExpressionEvaluator(ctx)
+
+			suffixMatcher := func(suffix string) any {
+				return mock.MatchedBy(func(actionDir string) bool {
+					return strings.HasSuffix(actionDir, suffix)
+				})
+			}
+			sarm.On("readAction", sar.Step, suffixMatcher(sar.Step.UsesHash()), "", mock.Anything, mock.Anything).Return(&model.Action{}, nil)
+
+			err := sar.prepareActionExecutor()(ctx)
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+			assert.Equal(t, tt.wantCloneToken, capturedToken)
+
+			sarm.AssertExpectations(t)
+		})
+	}
+}