bircni 14ec00b66e fix!: strip host-escape container options when privileged mode is disabled (#1058) ...

Workflow-controlled `jobs.<job>.container.options` were merged directly into the
Docker `HostConfig`. When the runner's privileged mode is disabled, only
`Privileged` was forced to `false` — host namespace flags, capability expansion,
security-profile overrides, and device/runtime access from the workflow YAML
survived into the final `HostConfig`. A workflow author could therefore enter
host PID/IPC namespaces and execute commands as root on the runner host:

```yaml
container:
  image: ubuntu:22.04
  options: >-
    --pid=host --ipc=host --cap-add=ALL
    --security-opt seccomp=unconfined --security-opt apparmor=unconfined
```

## Fix

`mergeContainerConfigs()` now strips the dangerous options-derived `HostConfig`
fields before merging when privileged mode is off: `PidMode`, `IpcMode`,
`UTSMode`, `CgroupnsMode`, `UsernsMode`, `CapAdd`, `SecurityOpt`, `Devices`,
`DeviceCgroupRules`, `DeviceRequests`, `VolumesFrom`, `Runtime`, `CgroupParent`,
and `Sysctls`. Each strip emits a warning, matching the existing
`--network ignored` handling. Options remain honored when privileged mode is
enabled, since the administrator has already opted into host access.

Reviewed-on: https://gitea.com/gitea/runner/pulls/1058
Reviewed-by: Zettat123 <39446+zettat123@noreply.gitea.com>

2026-07-31 12:43:19 +00:00

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